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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5045 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, ESQ., for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Employer 
HINMAN STRAUB, P.C. (NANCY L. BURRITT AND JOHN SACCOCIO of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (State) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting a petition filed by the New York 
State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 
82), seeking to represent certain employees of the State's Departments of 
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Environmental Conservation (En Con) and Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation 
(Parks), currently represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), in the Security Services Unit. 
A hearing was held at which all parties were present and represented by 
counsel. At the hearing, the parties entered into a stipulation, as recited by the ALJ on 
the record, that provides, as here relevant, the following: 
First, Council 82 withdraws any allegations in support of the 
fragmentation other than the law enforcement functions of 
the at-issue personnel and most specifically, Council 82 is 
withdrawing any allegations with respect to inadequate 
representation. 
Second, if a bargaining unit is created in a final order of the 
board or under this proceeding, if a final -excuse me- if a 
separate bargaining unit is created by virtue of the law 
enforcement functions of the at-issue personnel, obviously 
subject to review by the board and the courts, but the parties 
agree that this unit is appropriate and, therefore, the next 
step would be the conduct of an election....1 
Both the State and Council 82 filed briefs with the ALJ, NYSCOPBA did not. The 
ALJ thereafter determined that the petition should be granted and fragmented the 
petitioned-for titles - Traffic and Park Officer, Park Patrol Officer, Environmental 
Conservation Investigator I and II, Environmental Conservation Officer, Environmental 
Conservation Officer Trainee I and II, Supervising Environmental Conservation Officer 
and Forest Ranger I and II - from the Security Services Unit, leaving in the unit, as here 
relevant, employees in the corrections officers series and the University Police Officer I 
and II and University Police Investigator I and II titles. The ALJ relied upon our earlier 
1Transcript, pp. 12-13. 
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decision in County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB 1J3031 (1996) 
(hereafter, Erie), in which we fragmented deputy sheriffs with exclusively or primarily 
law enforcement duties from a unit of deputy sheriffs with custodial duties, finding that 
the titles at-issue in this case were primarily or exclusively involved in the enforcement 
of the laws of the State of New York or the detection and prevention of conduct that is 
criminalized by the laws administered by either En Con or Parks. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the at-issue titles should 
not be fragmented from the existing unit because PERB has already decided that the 
Security Services Unit is the most appropriate unit for these employees and the State 
has been found to be different from other public employers with respect to uniting ; 
) 
determinations, and because the stipulation entered into by the parties did not, as the 
ALJ found, preclude consideration of the State's administrative convenience and most 
appropriate unit arguments. Council 82 supports the ALJ's decision; NYSCOPBA has 
filed neither exceptions to the ALJ's decision nor a response to the State's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the ALJ's decision. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
Council 82 argues, and the ALJ so found, that the stipulation delineated by the 
ALJ on the record and entered into by the parties, defined the most appropriate unit 
and that the only issue before the ALJ was whether the at-issue titles should be 
fragmented from the Security Services Unit on the basis of our decision in Erie. At the 
) 
hearing, NYSCOPBA sought to introduce evidence that the State University of New 
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York (SUNY) university police officer and university police investigator titles were police 
officers and that if employees with police duties and responsibilities were to be removed 
from its unit, the most appropriate unit was not the one sought by Council 82 but one 
including the at-issue titles and the university police officer and university police 
invest igator 
would have introduced the same evidence if NYSCOPBA had not. On the basis of that 
evidence, the State argued that it would be inappropriate to fragment the at-issue titles 
from the Security Services Unit on the basis of their police duties and leave other police 
officers - the university police officer and university police investigator titles - in the unit 
with the corrections officers and others, who are not police officers. The State sought 
the dismissal of the petition on that ground, as well as upon the ground that the 
) • 
proceeding was an investigation and that it was incumbent upon PERB to have a 
complete record upon which to base its decision. The State also argued that the 
evidence relating to the university police officer and university police investigator titles 
would support its administrative convenience argument.3 Council 82 reiterated that it 
had given up certain of its arguments - inadequate representation of the at-issue titles 
by NYSCOPBA - in return for the stipulation as to the appropriateness of the unit and 
that no evidence therefore should be admitted as to any other unit titles. While allowing 
NYSCOPBA's witness to testify about the job requirements and duties of the university 
police officer and university police investigator titles, the ALJ rejected the evidence 
2Transcript, p. 336. 
3Transcript, p. 338. 
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when reaching his uniting determination. The ALJ sustained Council 82's objection and 
found that the stipulation evidenced an agreement that if the at-issue titles were 
fragmented from the Security Services Unit, the resulting unit would be the most 
appropriate unit. 
We disagree with the AJ^J^ 
stipulation and we determine that we will consider the evidence and arguments made 
with respect to the university police officer and university police investigator titles in 
defining the most appropriate unit. We have long held that we are not bound by the 
parties' proposed uniting configurations.4 As a representation case is an investigation 
conducted to enable us to ascertain that the unit petitioned for is the most appropriate 
unit,5 we may inquire into the make-up of the petitioned-for unit and even whether titles 
not included in the petition are appropriately placed in the proposed unit.6 Further, the 
stipulation itself provides that it is "subject to review by the board". We will, therefore, 
consider the placement of the university police officer and university police investigator 
titles in making our unit determination herein. 
4See New York Convention Center Operating Corp., 27 PERB 1J3034 (1994). 
See also Great Neck Bd. of Educ. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 7, Town of North 
Hempstead, 4 PERB 1J3017 (1971); State of New York, 1 PERB j[399.85 (1968); 
confirmed sub nom. CSEA v. Helsby, 32 AD2d 131, 2 PERB 1J7007 (3d Dep't 1969), 
^.ff'^i nc M W O ^ J o / fo n n c D D *T7r\-io / n n c m 
ail U t-O IN I Z.U O t i , £- r CrVD ]| / U I O \\ C7UC7 j . 
5Jerome Lefkowitz, et al., Public Sector Labor and Employment Law, 365-66 (2d 
ed. 1998) 
6See, State of New York, supra note 4. 
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FACTS 
The facts are recited in detail in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as necessary for the issues on appeal.7 
All the titles here in issue are currently in the Security Services Unit. The original 
unit determination was madeL in_1968, creating the unit,..along. vy|thfpjjrMhei.unM,.M..._ 
State employees.8 In 1969, the titles then in the unit were delineated and finalized.9 The 
units created were neither the overall unit of State employees, excluding state police 
and professional employees of SUNY, sought by the State, nor the smaller units sought 
by numerous petitioning employee organizations. The Security Services Unit has been 
altered over the years to add seasonal lifeguards,10 to remove parkway traffic and park 
officers,11 and to remove supervisory personnel.12 
The vast majority of the approximately 20,000 employees in the unit are in the 
corrections officers titles. The at-issue titles in En Con and Parks make up only 523 
employees. There are also approximately 389 university police officers and 27 
university police investigators in the Security Services Unit. 
7See, State of New York, 34 PERB 1J4013 (2001). 
8State of New York, supra, note 4. 
9State of New York, 2 PERB ^3037 (1969). 
wState of New York, 5 PERB 1J3022 (1972). 
11
 Laws of 1979, Chapter 276. See also State of New York (Office of Parks and 
Recreation), 13 PERB P079 (1980), confirmed sub nom. Russell v. PERB, 14 PERB 
U7010 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1981). 
) 
12See, e.g., State of New York, 21 PERB j[3050 (1988). 
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The corrections officers are peace officers pursuant to §2.10(25) of the Criminal 
Procedure Law (CPL). Their responsibilities include the care, custody and security of 
inmates incarcerated in the State's correctional facilities and camps. They may be 
required to carry firearms, but usually do not. They are empowered to make arrests but 
do not do so as part of their job duties. Corrections officers undergo a seven-week 
training program at the Correctional Services Training Academy. They then receive four 
weeks of on-the-job training. 
The traffic and police officers13 and park police officers are police officers 
pursuant to CPL §1.20.34(e). Civil Service Law, §58(3) also identifies these employees 
as police officers as they are members of the regional state park police who are 
responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the 
general criminal laws of the State. Pursuant to this authority, the traffic and safety 
officers and park police officers maintain order within the park facilities to preserve and 
protect the natural and historic resources of the State. They administer and enforce all 
laws, rules and regulations of the State to protect persons and property from injury or 
damage. They patrol the park facilities and conduct police inquiries and investigations. 
They execute warrants and make felony arrests within the State's parks. They are 
required to testify in court. They are uniformed officers, carry firearms, handcuffs and 
pepper spray and are assigned police vehicles with a full range of police equipment. 
13This title is being phased out through attrition and is being replaced by the park 
police officer title. 
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These employees must complete at least sixty semester credit hours of college, 
pass the civil service exam and complete a twenty-three week residential training 
course and on-the-job training to be employed as traffic and safety officers and park 
police officers. 
The environmental conservation officers and investigators are police officers 
pursuant to CPL §1.20.34(j). They attend a residential training academy and in-service 
training (traineeship) for at least 536 hours, which exceeds the minimum required by the 
Municipal Police Training Council. On a daily basis, the officers enforce all of the laws 
of the State of New York. While their primary responsibility is to investigate violations of 
the Environmental Conservation Law, in the course of those duties, they regularly are 
called upon to enforce all other State laws, including the Penal Law and the Vehicle and 
Traffic Law. When not involved in an investigation, the officers patrol the region to 
which they are assigned. They may issue tickets and arrest violators. The 
environmental conservation officers wear full police uniforms, carry weapons and 
pepper spray. They drive fully-equipped police vehicles. 
The environmental conservation investigator I and II are "situated in special 
centralized task forces to conduct investigations of criminal violations of the hazardous 
and toxic waste provisions of the Environmental Conservation Law."14 The investigators 
also supervise all other personnel involved in such investigations. They train the 
environmental conservation officers in the principles and procedures of investigating 
14Civil Service Standard for Environmental Conservation Investigators. State of 
New York, 34 PERB 1J4013, at 4038 (2001). 
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hazardous waste violations because the officers primarily conduct investigations of 
pollution which is not of a criminal nature and which does not involve hazardous waste. 
The investigators draft warrants, execute search and seizure warrants, testify in court 
and perform undercover work as necessary. The investigators may also be involved in 
other criminal investigations, from_homicides toitheftof equipment to disorderly 
conduct. Investigators must have been a fully qualified environmental conservation 
officer to be considered for the investigator position. 
Forest rangers are peace officers pursuant to CPL §2.10.33. They must have 
completed sixty semester credit hours of college, including or supplemented by fifteen 
hours in environmental/life science and two years of technical work in related fields, or a 
bachelor's degree, including thirty hours of environmental/life science. They complete a 
twenty-six week training program at the Office of Public Protection Academy, which 
meets training and mandatory certifications necessary for law enforcement officers. The 
training includes instruction in wildland fire suppression, search and rescue, use of 
helicopters and emergency management. Forest rangers also complete a one-week 
training program for operation of emergency vehicles. In order to respond to 
emergencies in wilderness areas, they are on call and available for duty twenty-four 
hours a day. 
The forest rangers carry handguns, collapsible batons and pepper spray while on 
duty. They patrol both day and night by foot, motor vehicle, ATV, snowmobile or boat to 
provide law enforcement and emergency response to remote and inaccessible regions 
of the State. They enforce the Environmental Conservation Law, Parks and Recreation 
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Law, Vehicle and Traffic Law, Penal Law and Alcohol and Beverage Control Law and 
provide assistance to other law enforcement agencies. Forest rangers may obtain 
warrants, issue appearance tickets and make custodial arrests. Approximately 50% of 
their duties are related to law enforcement. Twenty per cent of the forest rangers' job 
duties involve search and rescue efforts. Pursuant to the Search and RescueLaw, ECL 
§9-0105, the forest rangers are authorized to organize, direct and execute search and 
rescue operations for lost persons or civilian aircraft, including the organizing and 
directing of all responding personnel and resources; for example, State police, deputy 
sheriffs, firefighters, search dogs and search teams. Their training and expertise is also 
utilized in support of criminal investigations involving searches for fugitives and 
evidence. The forest rangers also have significant responsibilities in the areas of fire 
fighting and stewardship of the State's natural resources. 
The university police officer I and II and university police investigator I and II titles 
are designated as police officers in CPL §1.20.34(s). They are required to have 
completed sixty college semester credit hours and a sixteen week police training course 
at the State Police Academy. In addition, they receive two additional weeks of field 
training and subsequent specialized training, in the use of a Breathalyzer or radar, as 
warranted. They have Statewide jurisdiction and may carry guns, handcuffs, mace, a 
radio and pepper spray, as they patrol SUNY campuses on foot, bicycle or in a fully-
equipped police car. They investigate complaints, respond to requests for assistance 
and may be involved on a daily basis with drug and alcohol offenses, harassment, 
assault, rape and traffic incidents. They make arrests or issue appearance tickets, as 
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the case may warrant. The investigator I and II titles are promotional titles and have the 
same training and authority as the university police officers. They work in conjunction 
with local police agencies in the investigation of criminal activity and supervise the 
university police officers. 
DISCUSSION 
The State argues that the ALJ erred in applying Erie to a uniting case involving 
the State. The basis for its argument is that PERB has already decided the most 
appropriate unit for these employees and also that the State has been found by this 
Board to be different from local jurisdictions with respect to uniting determinations. 
The first argument may be summarily dismissed. We have on many occasions 
altered the State bargaining units, adding or removing titles, or creating new units 
entirely.15 The Security Services Unit has itself been the subject of several decisions, 
adding titles and removing titles.16 Indeed, the Laws of 1979, Chapter 276, §10, which 
removed the parkway patrol function from the traffic and park officers and transferred it 
to the State Police and returned the traffic and park officer title to the security services 
unit, specifically notes that "[sjuch restoration shall not be construed to limit the public 
employment relations board from subsequently including these titles in a collective 
bargaining unit, other than the security service unit..." 
15See, e.g., State of New York, supra note 4. 
16See, e.g., notes 10 and 12, supra. 
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The second aspect of the State's argument, that it is or should be treated 
differently than other public employers in the resolution of uniting questions because of 
its unique status, is likewise without merit. The State relies upon the decision of the 
Acting Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Acting Director) in 
Sfate of Atew Yor/c, 9 PERBJ4016 
petition seeking to carve out one group of six printers from the Operating Services Unit 
which contained 300 other employees in the same job title, the Acting Director noted 
that the Board had already determined that there should be five units of State 
employees, "because of the circumstances which distinguish the State as an employer 
from all others...." Decisions of the Acting Director are not binding on the Board. We 
also find that the Acting Director's dicta, opining on the Board's rationale behind the 
initial uniting cases, lacks precedential value. 
The State here also relies on County of Rockland, 10 PERB ^3014 (1977). 
There, in discussing the initial uniting case [State of New York, 1 PERB 1J399.85 
(1968)], the Board noted that "[g]iven the many different professions and other 
occupations found in State service and the potential for a myriad of units, that case may 
be distinguished from cases involving local government."17 The State here points to that 
statement as a recognition by the Board that the State occupies a unique position and 
that uniting decisions applicable to local governments are not applicable to the State. 
The State misapprehends the meaning of that statement. The uniting criteria utilized by 
1710 PERB 1J3014, at 3030, n.4 (1977). 
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PERB are the same regardless of the identity of the public employer involved. The 
distinction lies in the factual differences present in each case, whether it is the State, 
county, city, town or village, or some other public employer. 
The State further argues that the ALJ misapplied Erie to the facts of this case.18 
In Erie, we fragmented deputy sheriffs-criminal from a ynit: of deputy;sheriffsrpffleers 
because, like police officers employed by local government, they, in the words of City of 
Amsterdam,19 were concerned with "the broad spectrum of human rights, public order 
and the protection of life and property." We found in Erie20 that deputy sheriffs who "are 
or can be regularly exposed to that type of law enforcement by virtue of their status, 
qualifications and required training" are not properly included in a unit of other deputy 
sheriffs whose primary function is the supervision and custody of inmates. 
We defined the class of employee we would consider to be involved in law 
enforcement to the extent that fragmentation from a unit of other deputy sheriffs would 
be appropriate. We determined that such an employee must be responsible for the 
prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of 
the State and that such duties are the exclusive or primary characteristic of that 
employee. In Erie, we recognized the basic differences between employees who have 
as the primary attribute of their employment criminal law enforcement and those who do 
18The State argues in its exceptions that the ALJ misapplied Erie only as to his 
determination on the status of the forest ranger titles and the En Con titles. 
1910 PERB lf3031 (1977). 
) 
'29 PERB H3031, at 3069. 
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not. As in Erie, here the En Con employees are qualified, and are expected by the 
State, to perform the full range of law enforcement work which employees in the 
correction officers titles are not.21 The State argues that none of the petitioned for En 
Con employees meet these criteria and that the petition must be dismissed as to them. 
We disagree, 
The environmental conservation officer, environmental conservation officer 
trainee I and II, supervising environmental conservation officer titles and environmental 
conservation investigator I and II, are all police officers within the meaning of the 
Criminal Procedure Law. They are all responsible for the detection and prevention of 
crime and the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State of New York, as well as a 
variety of other laws, including the Environmental Conservation Law. Such duties are 
their exclusive and primary responsibility. The State argues that because they are 
primarily involved in the enforcement of the Environmental Conservation Law, they do 
not meet the criteria articulated in Erie for fragmentation. 
As we noted in Erie, with respect to the various deputy sheriff-criminal titles, 
the degree of involvement with criminal law enforcement 
activities will vary by individual according to their area of 
assignment at any given time. That circumstance is equally 
true, however, among the police officer members of 
municipal police departments. The uniting standard 
articulated in this case produces a unit which we consider to 
be entirely in keeping with our prevailing practice regarding 
all other police officers. The unit we fashion consists of 
those in the police services division of the sheriffs 
department and includes road patrol officers, detectives, 
supervisory personnel, and others providing ancillary 
services (emphasis added) which are directly and 
predominantly related to criminal law enforcement. 
Supra, note 19, at 3070. 
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Here, the En Con officers are all qualified, trained, equipped and expected to 
perform as police officers. That they are engaged in specialized law enforcement simply 
evidences the degree to which they are involved in criminal law enforcement as well as 
their involvement with "ancillary services". The expectation is that they are, or can be, 
.exposedjo.crimjnaJ.Jaw_.enfpxcementJnJh 
The same is true of the forest ranger titles. Although not police officers within the 
meaning of the Criminal Procedure Law, the forest rangers meet the criteria set forth in 
Erie in their qualifications, training and job duties. The record establishes that they are 
involved in law enforcement as 30% to 50% of their duties, in addition to being involved 
in search and rescue or fugitive and evidence searches for another 20% of their 
assigned duties. As such, they are clearly providing ancillary services which are directly 
and predominantly related to criminal law enforcement. As we noted in Erie, 
classification as a police officer alone is an insufficient basis for determining unit 
placement. The corollary is, likewise, true. Classification as a peace officer is 
insufficient by itself for determining the most appropriate unit placement. There the 
deputy sheriffs-officer were police officers but were not "responsible for the prevention 
and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of the state." 
Here, the forest rangers are not police officers within the meaning of the Criminal 
Procedure Law, but have the other characteristics which we found crucial to support 
fragmentation in Erie. Given these considerations, we find that the forest ranger titles 
are more appropriately grouped with the other En Con employees and the Park 
employees in the petitioned for unit, than with the correction officer titles and other titles 
remaining in the Security Services Unit. 
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We reach finally the question of the university police officer and investigator 
titles. These employees are police officers within the meaning of the Criminal 
Procedure Law. They are qualified, trained and equipped in the same manner as 
municipal police officers and the petitioned for titles. Their duties are similar to those of 
the traffic and park officer and park patrol officer, although performed at the State's 
universities and colleges as opposed to the State's parks. Just as it is no longer 
appropriate under Erie to include the titles sought to be fragmented by Council 82 in the 
Security Services Unit, it would be inappropriate to leave the university police officer 
and investigator titles in that unit. For these reasons, we find that they are appropriately 
grouped with the petitioned-for titles. As we noted earlier, we are not bound by the units 
proposed by the parties. Our obligation is to create the most appropriate unit, 
especially when additional titles have already been put in issue by one or more of the 
parties, as was done here both by the State and NYSCOPBA.22 
Finally, the State argues that its administrative convenience is not served by the 
creation of an additional bargaining unit which will result in additional administrative 
responsibilities for the State. We reject this argument. Once again citing to Erie, 
[t]he mere possibility, even likelihood, that there will be some labor 
relations or personnel issues created as a result of the fragmentation of 
the deputy sheriffs-criminal is not a reason to deny them what is 
otherwise clearly the most appropriate unit in view of the 'strong prevailing 
practice of having separate units for policemen.23 
22We do not consider the placement of these titles in the State Police Unit 
because of the difference in dispute resolution procedures available to these 
employees and those in the State Police Unit. See, Act, §209.2; City ofLockport, 30 
PERB H3049(1997). 
2329 PERB 1f3031, at 3070 (1996), citing City of Amsterdam, 10 PERB 1J3031, at 
3062(1977). 
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While we are not unmindful of the State's financial concerns, the possibility that the 
State will incur additional administrative or personnel costs in negotiating and 
administering the contract for another bargaining unit is not a sufficient basis for 
dismissing Council 82's petition. 
IT_JS.,.IHEREf^RE,._OHD£REDJhat.there.will.b(B.a_riegotiating.jLinit,establlshe.d..... 
as follows: 
Included: Traffic and Park Officer, Park Patrol Officer, 
Environmental Conservation Investigator I and 
II, Environmental Conservation Officer, 
Environmental Conservation Officer Trainee I 
and II, Supervising Environmental 
Conservation Officer, University Police Officer I 
and II, University Police Investigator I and II, 
and Forest Ranger I and II. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the matter is remanded to the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this decision.24 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
_S7\ 
Micha4hR. Cuevas, Chaimna 
f M ^ r ^ A ^ b o t t , Memb§ 
/ Jdhn T. Mitchell, Member 
24The unit we find to be most appropriate is significantly larger that the unit 
originally described in Council 82's petition. The Director, therefore, upon review of 
Council 82's showing of interest for the original unit, may determine that it is not 
sufficient for participation in the election for the larger unit. The Director may permit 
Council 82 sufficient time in which to file a showing of interest for that unit. See Public 
Sector Labor and Employment Law, 418-19, supra note 5 ; Levittown Union Free Sch. 
Dist, 15 PERB 1J3095 (1982). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
DUTCHESS COUNTY LOCAL 814, TOWN OF 
POUGHKEEPSIEUNIT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22231 
TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
PACER & BUTTRIDGE (PAUL G. HANSON of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of Poughkeepsie 
(Town) to a decision of the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) which found that the Town violated §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) on a charge filed by the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Dutchess 
County Local 814, Town of Poughkeepsie Unit (CSEA) when it terminated John 
Scheib's employment because of his efforts to organize a CSEA bargaining unit in the 
Town's highway department. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The Town excepts to the Assistant Director's decision on the law and the facts. 
The Town argues that Scheib was not engaged in a protected activity at the time he 
was disciplined for handing out union literature. CSEA has filed a response in which it 
generally disputes the contents of the Town's exceptions. 
FACTS 
We will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to the Town's exceptions. 
The improper practice charge was filed on December 20, 2000, alleging, inter 
alia, that John Scheib, a laborer working in the Town's highway department, was 
actively involved in CSEA's effort to organize the highway department. CSEA 
N represents other Town employees and the typist in the highway department. 
Scheib had been employed by the Town as a laborer from October 1995 to 
September 29, 2000, the date of his official employment termination. Scheib testified 
that, during the spring of 2000, he had contacted the local CSEA president, Patrick 
Brown, regarding the steps to take in order to organize the Town's highway department. 
Brown instructed Scheib to contact CSEA's Albany representative, Phoebe Mackey. 
After contacting Mackey, Scheib commenced his efforts to organize the highway 
department. Mackey had instructed Scheib to confine his organizational activity to non-
work times of the day, such as lunch time, break time and before or after work. 
The dispute over Scheib's efforts to organize the highway department arose just 
before quitting time on September 19, 2000, while Scheib was conversing with a small 
group of highway department employees. The work day for the highway department 
) 
was 6:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. The undisputed testimony of the Town's witness revealed 
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that the highway department had no rule or policy that prohibited employees from 
distributing union literature on company time or on company premises.1 
On September 19, 2000, at about 4:20 p.m., Scheib was talking to a group of 
employees who were smoking when Wayne Metrando, a highway department 
employee..who happened to..walk past this.group, asked Scheib for a union card. 
Scheib retrieved a card from his truck, put it on the stairs nearby and pointed the card 
out to Metrando. Metrando picked up the card and walked directly into the office of 
highway superintendent, Jack Still. A few minutes later, deputy highway 
superintendent, Jack Harris, exited from Still's office and confronted Scheib with the 
union card. 
While there is some dispute over the language used by Harris when he 
confronted Scheib with the union material, the record is clear that he advised Scheib 
that he could not hand out union material on Town time and Town property.2 Scheib 
denied any wrongdoing and, since it was the end of the work day, Scheib exited the 
highway department. 
On September 20, 2000, when Scheib arrived at work, Harris directed him to see 
Still. Scheib obeyed Harris and, during his conversation with Still, Scheib again denied 
any involvement with the union material.3 At that point, Still directed Scheib to leave the 
department and have his "lawyers contact our lawyers."4 
1Tran«r ' . r int nn 1 F^l-1 Ft"? 
2Transcript, p. 146. 
3Transcript, p. 45. 
4/d. 
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Scheib was never authorized to return to work. On October 19, 2000, Still 
submitted a form to the Town personnel office that indicated Scheib's employment had 
been terminated effective September 29, 2000, for "conduct detrimental to highway 
department".5 
DISCUSSION 
Based upon our review of the record as it relates to the Town's exceptions, and 
our consideration of the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the Assistant 
Director. 
The right of public employees to form, join and participate in, or to refrain from 
forming, joining, or participating in any employee organization of their own choosing is 
guaranteed by the Act.6 Furthermore, the Act gives a public employee the right to be 
represented by an employee organization, to negotiate collectively with the public 
employer over the terms and conditions of employment, as well as the administration of 
grievances arising out of the employment relationship.7 
The limits of these rights have been tested since the enactment of the Act. We 
have consistently held that interference and/or discrimination arising out of an 
employee's participation in organizational activity invokes the protections of the Act.8 
5Transcript pp. 10-11, 84. 
6Act, §202. 
7Act, §203. 
8Act, §§209-a.1(a) and(c). See Rosen v. PERB, 72 NY2d 42, 21 PERB 1J7014 
(1988); Town of Gates, 15 PERB 1J3079 (1982). 
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As the Assistant Director correctly pointed out in his decision, the essential 
elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and 
(c) were set forth in the Town of Independence.9 The burden of persuasion lies with the 
charging party to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the public 
- employer acted_withimproper_motivation.10 
The record establishes that the first and second elements of the charge had 
been satisfied. Scheib was engaged in a protected activity because of his participation 
in organizational activities and his supervisors were aware of his activities. The Town, 
however, argues in its exceptions that Scheib's activity was not protected because he 
distributed CSEA membership cards during work hours and on the employer's property. 
The ALJ found this argument to be pretextual and we agree. CSEA urges us to 
consider the NLRB decision in Sweet Street Desserts, Inc., 319 NLRB 307, 312; 152 
LRRM 1102 (1995) (hereafter, Sweet), for support that, in the absence of a pre-existing 
policy regarding the distribution of union material, a violation may be found on the 
theory that not all parts of the employer's premises nor all hours of the work day 
constitute workplace or work time. Even though we are not constrained to follow 
federal law applicable to private employment under our statute,11 we find instructive the 
NLRB's decisions in Sweet and also Filene's Basement Store™ where the NLRB 
923PERBH3020(1990). 
10See State of New York (SUNY-Oswego), 34 PERB H3035 (2001). 
11Civil Service Law §209-a(6); City Sch. Dist. of the City of New Rochelle, 
4 PERB U3060(1971). 
12299 NLRB 183 (1990). 
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determined that the employer's prohibition of solicitation on break time was overly broad 
and discriminatory, even though the work breaks were paid time. 
Here, the record is devoid of any evidence that the Town had promulgated a rule 
or policy which limited the employees' access to other employees or to the employer's 
propertyforthepurpose of distributing union material. Scheibhanded a designation 
card to a fellow employee, upon his request, at the end of the day, when the day's work 
had been completed, and the employees were permitted to engage in personal 
activities, such as smoking and cleaning up prior to punching out for the day. While the 
record is unclear as to the extent or duration of the employer's knowledge of Scheib's 
union activities, it is clear that, on September 19, 2000, Harris confronted Scheib with 
the union material and directed Scheib not to hand out union material on Town time 
) 
and/or property. Harris further directed Scheib to see Still in the morning following this 
incident. 
It is evident, upon this record, that "but for" Scheib's organizational activity, Still 
would not have taken any disciplinary action against Scheib. This inference can be 
drawn from the fact that Still sent Scheib home without any explanation, never 
admonishing him for his "alleged" breach of any Town rule or policy. Instead, Still 
directed Scheib to have his attorney contact the Town's attorney before he could return. 
The record demonstrates that, while the attorneys were attempting to communicate with 
each other, Still submitted a form to the personnel office indicating Scheib's 
employment was terminated on September 29, 2000. 
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The Town argued in its defense that it had a legitimate business reason to 
terminate Scheib's employment. We disagree. The Town's two witnesses, Harris and 
Metrando, testified about Scheib's poor work performance, citing examples of past 
disciplinary problems. However, Harris, who was in a supervisory position, testified that 
Scheib had never been disciplined for his alleged poor work performance.13 The Town 
offers no other justification for its termination of Scheib during an organizational 
campaign, apart from these past instances. We find and conclude, therefore, that the 
Town has failed to establish a legitimate business reason defense.14 
We find that the record supports the Assistant Director's conclusions and the 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Offer reinstatement to John Scheib to his former position as laborer in its 
highway department with full pay and benefits retroactive to 
September 20, 2000, until the offer of reinstatement, less earnings from 
other employment, with interest at the maximum current legal rate; 
2. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, coercing 
or discriminating against employees for the exercise of rights 
protected under the Act; 
13One earlier incident resulted in Scheib's dismissal but he was later returned to 
work. 
14See Town of Independence, supra, note 9. Compare New York City Transit 
Auth. (Fredericson), 34 PERB 1J3025 (2001); Holbrook Fire Dist, 33 PERB fl3050 
(2000); Rockville Centre Union Free Sch. Dist, 32 PERB fl3050 (1999). 
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3. Sign and conspicuously post the attached notice at all work locations 
normally used to communicate with employees of the highway 
department. 
-8 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ John T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Poughkeepsie in the unit represented by Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Dutchess County Local 814, Town of 
Poughkeepsie Unit, that the Town shall: 
1. Offer reinstatement to John Scheib to his former position as laborer in its 
highway department with full pay and benefits retroactive to September 20, 
2000, until the offer of reinstatement, less earnings from other employment, 
with interest at the maximum current legal rate. 
2. Not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate against employees forthe 
exercise of rights protected under the Act. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF POUGHKEEPSIE 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, orcovered 
by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
ChargingParty, 
-and- CASE NO. U-21827 
ROSWELL PARK CANCER INSTITUTE, 
Respondent. 
FREDERICK M. BECKER, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL ( MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge that the Roswell Park Cancer Institute (RPCI) violated §§209-a.1 (a), (c) and (d) 
of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally promulgated an 
Administrative Policy and Procedure Manual (Manual). 
The improper practice charge initially referred to eight different sections of the 
Manual with which PEF took issue. After the pre-hearing conference, PEF withdrew the 
charge as to aii but two of the sections of the Manual: Policy No. 213.1 - Performance 
Evaluation and Policy No. 300.D.21 - Security Surveillance Procedure. RPCI thereafter 
made a motion to dismiss the charge. PEF filed an offer of proof as to its remaining 
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allegations, but argued that a hearing was necessary. On the basis of the motion and 
the offer, the conferencing ALJ determined that there were no facts in dispute and a 
hearing was not required for disposition of the charge. The matter was then decided 
based on the parties' submissions and briefs, as well as correspondence confirming the 
parties' agreements and the ALJ's directions as to the processing of the case. 
The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.1(d) allegation, finding that, as to Policy 
No. 213.1 - Performance Evaluation, there had been no unilateral change in the 
performance evaluation procedures.1 The allegations that §§209-a.1(a) and (c) were 
violated were dismissed for lack of proof. 
EXCEPTIONS 
PEF excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that it was in error to decide this 
matter without a hearing and arguing, as to Policy No. 213.1, that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the charge. RPCI supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
RPCI is a public benefit corporation. PEF represents the at-issue employees and 
their terms and conditions of employment are set forth in the collective bargaining 
agreement between the State of New York (State) and PEF covering the Professional, 
Scientific and Technical Unit (PS&T). 
1No exceptions have been taken as to the ALJ's dismissal of the improper 
practice charge allegations related to Policy No. 300.D.21 - Security Surveillance 
Procedure. We, therefore, do not make any determinations as to that part of the ALJ's 
decision which is not before us. 
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The parties' 1995-1999 and 1999-2003 collective bargaining agreements contain 
a memorandum of understanding (memorandum) covering performance evaluation. 
The memorandum provides that "the State has full and complete authority to exercise 
its prerogative to evaluate its employees so long as it does so in a manner not 
inconsistent with any of the provisions of paragraphs MIA through D below."2 The 
memorandum sets the evaluation periods for unit employees. The memorandum further 
provides that: 
Any questions or disputes arising from the interpretation or 
implementation of this Memorandum, or any other questions 
or disputes arising from the administration of the PS&T Unit 
Performance Evaluation System, shall be subject to 
labor/management discussion at the Agency level and/or the 
State level as appropriate as their sole and exclusive means 
of resolution.3 
PEF alleges that on May 5, 2000, RPCI issued the Manual which, as relevant to 
the charge, contains Policy No. 213.1 - Performance Evaluation. PEF alleges that the 
policy changes the performance evaluation procedure in effect since 1986 and was 
done for the purpose of interfering with union activity and depriving unit members of 
representation. The basis of this allegation is that just prior to the distribution of the 
Manual, RPCI changed a unit employee's evaluation from "unsatisfactory" to 
"satisfactory" based upon an appeal of the rating by PEF to the Statewide Performance 
Evaluation Appeals Board. 
2ALJ Exhibit 5. 
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As to the alleged changes in the procedure, PEF produced prior performance 
evaluation appeals which it alleged were handled in accordance with the State's 1986 
Employee Performance Evaluation Manual (1986 Manual). These, PEF alleges, 
establish that RPCI has changed certain aspects of the performance evaluation 
procedure by Policy No. 213.1.4 PEF alleges that the policy refers to documents that will 
be used for evaluation purposes without identifying those documents. There is no 
reference to "documents" in Policy No. 213.1. PEF also refers to the language which 
allows the RPCI Department of Human Resources Management to set the due date for 
the evaluations and gives departments sixty days to complete the evaluation form. PEF 
argues that the 1986 Manual required evaluations to be done on the employee's 
anniversary date in title and gave a six week time frame for the completion of evaluation 
) 
forms.5 The 1986 Manual does set the date for evaluations by the anniversary date, as 
does the memorandum of understanding. However, the 1986 Manual does not require 
that evaluations be completed within six weeks; that recommendation is found in a 
August 29, 1983 memorandum to agency employee relations officers from the 
Governor's Office of Employee Relations. 
4We do not consider the evaluation appeals referenced for the first time by PEF 
in its brief. See Lackav/anna City Sch. Dist, 28 PERB fi3023 (1995); County of Suffolk, 
26 PERB P076 (1993); Oswego City Sch. Dist, 25 PERB P052 (1992). 
Apparently, PEF has been successful in overturning some "unsatisfactory" 
ratings given to unit employees by arguing, inter alia, that the evaluations were not 
completed in a timely fashion. 
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DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that an ALJ has the discretion while processing an improper 
practice charge, either at a pre-hearing conference, after the conference, during the 
hearing or at any other appropriate juncture, to require a party to submit an offer of 
proof in support of the allegations being processed.6 Here, the ALJ properly required 
PEF to submit an offer of proof in response to RPCI's motion to dismiss because the 
charge contained no facts upon which a finding of a violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of 
the Act could be based. 
We have held, in deciding a motion to dismiss, that an ALJ is to assume the truth 
of all of the charging party's evidence and to give the charging party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.7 It is well-settled that the 
elements necessary to prove a case of interference or discrimination, in violation of 
§§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the Act, are that the affected individual was. engaged in 
protected activity, that such activity was known to the person(s) making the adverse 
employment decision, and that the action would not have taken place but for the 
protected activity.8 Here, the only evidence provided by PEF in its offer of proof in 
Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580, AFL-CIO and Central New York Regional 
Transp. Auth., 32 PERB fl3053 (1999); New York State Security and Law Enforcement 
Employees Council 82, AFSCME, 29 PERB 1J3015 (1996); Nanuet Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J3005 (1984); Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New 
York, 16 PERB fl3067 (1983); Village of Spring Valley Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, 
14 PERB H3010(1981). 
7See State of New York (Dep't of Correctional Servs.), 29 PERB P015 (1996); 
County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013 (1984). 
8See Plainedge Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3063 (1998); Town of 
Independence, 23 PERB H3020 (1990). 
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support of the alleged violations of (a) and (c) is the timing of the issuance of the 
Manual shortly after RPCI changed a unit employee's evaluation rating because PEF 
had appealed the rating. While the timing of that event could raise a suspicion, a 
suspicion is not evidence and timing alone is insufficient to establish the "but for" 
element of a_§.§209,a J._(a) or (c) violation.9 The ALJ properly dismissed these 
allegations. 
As to the alleged violation of §209-a.1(d), the ALJ found that PEF had failed to 
establish that Policy No. 213.1 of the Manual had changed the procedure used for the 
evaluation of unit employees. PEF makes conclusory allegations that Poiicy No. 213.1 
changes the 1986 Manual but offers no proof that would sustain its allegations. 
Further, PEF offered no evidence which establishes that the 1986 Manual is still in 
effect given the language of the subsequent memorandum of understanding which 
contains provisions for employee evaluations of unit employees. That memorandum 
also contains language authorizing the evaluation of employees in a manner chosen by 
management as long as it is not inconsistent with the language of the memorandum, as 
well as setting the specific evaluation periods, and providing that any questions or 
disputes related to the interpretation or implementation of the evaluation procedure are 
subject to labor/management discussion. Even given every reasonable inference which 
may be drawn from PEF's offer of proof, PEF has failed to establish that Policy 
No. 213.1 in any way varies the terms of the procedure set forth in either the 1986 
Manual or the memorandum of understanding. 
9See Town of North Hempstead, 32 PERB 1J3006 (1999);Bc/. of Educ. of the City 
Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 14 PERB j[3005 (1981) 
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For the reasons set forth above, we deny PEF's exceptions and we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Micb-ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
; 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 861, 
UNIT 9250^WYOMING COUNTY EMPLOYEES, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22099 
COUNTY OF WYOMING, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ERIC T. DADD, COUNTY ATTORNEY, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 861, Unit 9250, Wyoming County 
Employees (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an 
improper practice charge alleging that the County of Wyoming (County) violated §§209-
a.1 (a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it terminated a 
unit member's employment because of protected union activity. The County's answer 
generally denied the allegations. 
) 
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EXCEPTIONS 
CSEA has filed twenty-eight exceptions to the ALJ's decision. We will address 
the principal exceptions that allege the ALJ erred in her analysis of the facts as they 
applied to the Act. 
Based upjDn ourreyiewo 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
CSEA filed a charge alleging that, on July 28, 2000, one of its members, Rita 
Kabalan, a provisional employee of the Wyoming County Department of Social 
Services (Department), filed a grievance which sought reinstatement of compensatory 
time that had been removed from her leave accruals. 
Kabalan had been employed by the Department on March 6, 2000, as a case 
worker. On March 10, 2000, Kabalan received a copy of the Wyoming County Vehicle 
Use Policy. As a part of her work, Kabalan was required to conduct interviews with 
family members at their homes during non-business hours. On those occasions, and 
whenever case workers were required to work overtime, Kabalan was required to 
submit a form to her supervisor for approval. 
On April 4, 2000, the Department issued a memorandum to staff outlining the 
use of compensatory time. Kabalan filed her grievance in July 2000 upon being 
advised by her supervisor that she would not be able to use thirteen and three-quarter 
hours of compensatory time that she had accrued in May 2000. 
During her first five months of employment in the Department, Kabalan was 
assigned to the Home Finding Unit supervised by Case Supervisor Terrie Brown and 
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Senior Case Worker, Dennis Huff, who had specialized core supervisory training. Huff 
testified that during the time he was supervising Kabalan, he did not recall any concerns 
regarding her work. In fact, Huff related a conversation he had with Brown concerning 
Kabalan's notetaking. Brown commented that she had occasion to access Kabalan's 
case records; andI found that she kepLcujre^^^^ 
of employment, Kabalan was assigned to another unit, Child Welfare, under the 
supervision of Janet Sternberg. 
Sternberg testified that all new employees are given a set of job standards that 
the agency expects them to meet or exceed. At some point during the probationary 
period, at about three months, the employees are supposed to have a review and then 
at the end of six months, Sternberg testified, the supervisor was asked to do a review 
again.2 Sternberg was never asked by the Director of Social Services, Sheila Weaver, 
to perform an evaluation for Kabalan.3 Weaver testified that she did not speak with 
Kabalan about her job performance prior to the decision to terminate her employment 
with the County.4 A performance plan was never completed for Kabalan.5 
As a new employee in the Department, Kabalan was required to attend training 
in Buffalo, New York, that was scheduled over a ten-week period. Kabalan resided in 
1Transcript, p. 62. 
2Transcript, p. 93. 
3ld. 
4Transcript, p. 209, 228. 
5Transcript, pp. 211-213. 
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Gainesville, New York, at the time she was hired by the County. She later moved to 
Warsaw, where the County offices were located. The distance between Gainesville 
and Warsaw is about nine miles.6 
On those occasions when Kabalan was required to attend training classes in 
Buffalo, the County would provide a County car to her in order to avoid the trip into 
Warsaw and she would leave her vehicle parked in the County lot overnight.7 On at 
least two occasions when Kabalan was required to drive to Buffalo for training, she 
dropped off her son at school, which was on the way, and then proceeded to Buffalo.8 
On June 9, 2000, Weaver sent an e-mail message to Brown and Huff stating that 
she had observed Kabalan transporting a child in a County car. Weaver indicated that 
her concerns were two-fold: 1) Kabalan's training commenced at 9 a.m.; and 
2) Kabalan had signed the County car policy, which stated that no one should be 
transported in the County car unless it is work-related. Weaver's suspicion was that 
Kabalan was transporting her child to school. Weaver requested that Brown and Huff 
review the car policy with Kabalan and let her know the results.9 
Huff responded to Weaver's e-mail on June 14, 2000. He advised Weaver that 
he had addressed the car issue with Kabalan on June 14, 2000, and that she stated 
that she had transported her son with the County car as his bus transportation fell 
6Transcript, p. 110. 
7Transcript, pp. 112-113, 136. 
8Transcript, p. 66. 
9Charging Party Exhibit 2. 
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through and she would have been late for training if she had switched cars. Huff and 
Kabalan discussed options regarding how it could have been handled, and Kabalan 
was apologetic and agreed that it would never happen again. Kabalan also advised 
that she was not late for training.10 Huff verified with the trainer that Kabalan was not 
late. The record indicates that Weaver took no further action regarding this incident. 
Weaver also testified that she was not aware that Kabalan was keeping a 
County vehicle overnight. She first learned of this on August 25, 2000, when she was 
reviewing Kabalan's time records in preparation for the grievance hearing.11 Based 
upon Weaver's review of Kabalan's time records in August 2000, in which she felt there 
were certain discrepancies, and the transportation of her child in a County car, Weaver 
recommended to the Social Services Commissioner, Jeannette Wallace, that Kabalan's 
employment with the County be terminated. Kabalan's employment with Wyoming 
County was terminated without explanation on September 6, 2000.12 Less than two 
weeks prior to the termination, Kabalan's grievance was returned by the County 
Administrator, Kevin DeFebbo, to Commissioner Wallace, because it had come to him 
without a Step 2 hearing. Wallace was directed to set a date for the hearing, which was 
scheduled for September 7, 2000. Kabalan advised Wallace's office that she was 
unavailable on that date and suggested that either her representative could attend or 
the hearing could be rescheduled. 
10/d. 
"Transcript, p. 157, 168. 
12Charging Party Exhibit 8. 
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DISCUSSION 
In order to sustain a finding of a violation of §§209-a.1 (a) and (c), it must be 
shown that the affected individual was engaged in protected activity, that such activity 
was known to the person or persons making the adverse decision and that the action 
would nothavebeen taken "but for" the^ ^ protected activity.13 The ALJ correctly 
concluded that, upon this record, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of 
improper motivation to defeat the County's motion to dismiss at the close of CSEA's 
case. Upon such a finding, the obligation necessarily shifted to the County to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that, regardless of Kabalan's 
protected activity, it had a legitimate business reason to terminate her employment.14 
The ALJ concluded that the County based its decision to terminate Kabalan's 
employment on her improper use of a County vehicle and the alleged discrepancies in 
her overtime reports. The ALJ reached this conclusion based upon the entire record. 
The ALJ found no direct evidence of animus on the part of either Weaver or Wallace. 
The ALJ thus concluded that the coincident time between the filing and processing of 
Kabalan's grievance and her termination of employment was insufficient to establish 
improper motivation. 
It is axiomatic that our jurisdiction is limited to violations of the Act. The 
termination of a probationary employee's public employment must, therefore, implicate 
the protections afforded by the Act to trigger PERB's jurisdiction. It is in this area of 
13See, e.g., City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). 
uState of New York (SUNY Oswego), 34 PERB H3017. 
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discipline and/or termination of probationary employment that questions about the Act's 
coverage have arisen. 
As a probationary employee, Kabalan's employment was subject to termination 
at any time after the minimum period of probation.15 The conditions under which a 
probationary employee may be removed are governed by the Civil Service Law16 and 
the cases decided thereunder.17 The guiding principle in those cases is that the 
termination of employment must be done in good faith. Consequently, the burden is on 
the terminated probationary employee to demonstrate that the termination was done in 
bad faith. This principle is analogous to our interpretation of the Act. When alleging a 
discriminatory discharge, the burden of persuasion lies with the charging party to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the public employer acted with 
improper motivation. 
We have found that: 
...it is possible for an employee's discharge to violate §§209-a.1 (a) 
or (c) of the Act even if the actors responsible for the discharge 
bear no union animus, either generally or specifically. An animus 
finding is essentially evidentiary. A finding of animus helps to 
establish the necessary causation. On the other hand, the 
absence of animus can help to negate an inference or finding that 
an action was motivated improperly by the employee's exercise of 
statutorily protected rights.18 
15Civil Service Law, §63. 
i6W. 
nSee Williams v. Commissioner of Office of Mental Health of State of New York, 
259 AD2d 623 (2nd Dep't 1999); Gulemi v. Bradley, 267 AD2d 386 (2nd Dep't 1999). 
™State of New York (Dep't ofCorr. Serv.), 25 PERB ^3050, at 3106 (1992). 
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While timing alone is insufficient to support a finding of a violation of §§209-
a.1(a) and (c),19 a close proximity in time between a protected activity and an adverse 
action may be sufficient to raise a suspicion of a causal relationship.20 Proof of such a 
causal relationship may be found in circumstantial evidence.21 
Jt is...undisputed[that Kabalan, as a newemployee, was entitled Jo performance 
evaluations during her probationary term based upon certain criteria established by the 
department. The record is clear that during Kabalan's probationary period none of her 
supervisors, as well as Director Weaver, evaluated her performance. Notwithstanding, 
Kabalan's supervisors testified that they commended her on her work performance. 
The only issue that Weaver addressed was Kabalan's use of the County vehicle. 
However, Weaver took no steps to discipline Kabalan for the alleged misuse of the 
County vehicle while transporting her son to school. The ALJ discredited Weaver's 
testimony regarding Kabalan's permission to keep the County car overnight. 
Furthermore, there was conflicting testimony over the language of the policy and its 
application.22 Weaver's testimony was also suspect with regard to Kabalan's overtime 
^County of Monroe and Monroe County Sheriff, 33 PERB P044 (2000); Town of 
North Hempstead, 32 PERB 1J3006 (1999). 
20Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB P045 (1995); State of New York (Dep't of 
Social Services), 26 PERB 1J3026 (1993); County of Orleans, 25 PERB fl3010 (1992); 
Oyster Bay-East Norwich Cent. Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J3031 (1990). 
^Town of Independence, 23 PERB fl3020 (1990). 
22Transcript, p. 222. 
Board - U-22099 -9 
approval forms which framed the basis of Kabalan's compensatory time grievance. 
Weaver approved Kabalan's overtime and she maintained a calendar on her desk to 
track an employees' overtime against their caseload. While Weaver may not have had 
the vehicle logs contemporaneous with the overtime requests, she tracked Kabalan's 
overtime;...against her caseload and receivedJhe_yehjd_e Jo^ s^  atJhje_end_of the month 
following usage. Consequently, we find that Weaver's memo to the Personnel Office 
dated August 29, 2000, indicating that Kabalan's employment had been terminated 
because she violated the County Vehicle Use Policy and because she accumulated 
compensatory time while handling only five cases, is disingenuous and must be 
regarded as pretextual. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant CSEA's exceptions and reverse the ALJ's 
decision. Since the penalty of termination was imposed as a result of the County's 
violation of the Act, reinstatement with back pay is the appropriate remedy. This is 
especially so in view of the fact that the record does not reveal, nor has the County 
asserted, any facts evidencing Kabalan's poor work performance which might render 
reinstatement an inappropriate remedy.23 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith offer Rita Kabalan reinstatement to her former position; 
) 
County of Westchester, 34 PERB P013 (2001). 
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2. Make Kabalan whole for any loss of pay and benefits suffered by reason of 
her employment termination from the date thereof to the effective date of the 
offer of reinstatement, less any earnings derived from employment in the 
interim, with interest at the maximum current legal rate; 
3. Cease and desist from terminating Kabalan from employment because she 
filed a grievance on July 27, 2000. 
4. Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all locations ordinarily used to 
post informational notices to unit employees. 
DATED; December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
^IA^O^/A^^I^^ 
lael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES" FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Wyoming (County) in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 861, Unit 9250, Wyoming 
County Employees (CSEA) that the County will forthwith: 
1. Offer Rita Kabalan reinstatement to her former position. 
2. Make Kabalan whole for any loss of pay and benefits suffered by reason of her employment 
termination from the date thereof to the effective date of the offer of reinstatement, less any 
s earnings derived from other employment, with interest at the maximum current legal rate. 
3. Not terminate Kabalan from employment because she filed a grievance on July 27, 2000. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF WYOMING 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other materia!. 
CORRECTED COPY 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PATRICK HAUGHEY, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22096 




STATE OF NEW YORK - UNIFIED COURT 
SYSTEM, 
Employer. 
PATRICK HAUGHEY, pro se 
DUANE, MORRIS & HECKSCHER LLP (EVE I. KLEIN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
LAUREN P. DESOLE, CHIEF OF EMPLOYEE RELATIONS (RICHARD W. 
MCDOWELL of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Patrick Haughey, pro se, to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing Haughey's improper practice 
charge filed against the New York State Court Clerks Association (Association) alleging, 
inter alia, that the Association violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Board - U-22096 -2 
Employment Act (Act) when it failed to file a grievance on his behalf. Haughey's 
employer, State of New York - Unified Court System (UCS), is made a statutory party 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. The ALJ dismissed the charge as being untimely and 
as being moot. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Haughey excepts to the ALJ's decision dismissing the charge as moot. The 
Association and UCS support the ALJ's decision. 
FACTS 
We will confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
exceptions. A detailed description of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision. 
On November 1, 2000, Haughey filed an improper practice charge alleging that 
the Association breached its duty of fair representation when it failed to respond to a 
request on October 17, 2000, to represent him in a grievance that he had filed on 
November 29, 1999. 
The Association and USC each filed an answer in which they raised the 
affirmative defense of timeliness.1 The hearing was conducted on February 2, 2001, at 
which all parties were present. During the hiatus before the next hearing scheduled for 
May 1, 2001, the Association moved, on April 6, 2001, to dismiss the charge as moot 
because Haughey had resigned from the UCS on April 4, 2001. UCS joined the 
motion; Haughey opposed the motion. 
1Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.3(c)(2). 
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DISCUSSION 
In deciding the Association's motion to dismiss, the ALJ correctly applied the 
standard we enunciated in County of Nassau (Police Department),2 that the ALJ "must 
assume the truth of all of the charging party's evidence and give the charging party the 
benefit of all reasonable inferences that c o u ^ 
Upon our review of the record, we find that Haughey failed to establish that the 
alleged violation had occurred within the four months prior to the filing of the charge. 
As the ALJ noted in her decision, "Haughey testified that, on November 19, 1999, he 
asked a representative of the Association to file a grievance on his behalf. . . but that 
the representative refused."3 He then filed the grievance on his own on November 29, 
1999. Although Haughey alleges in his charge that the Association refused to respond 
to his letter of October 17, 2000, requesting representation, under our Rules and case 
law, it was November 29, 1999, when Haughey filed his own grievance after the 
Association refused his original request for representation that commenced the time to 
file his charge with PERB.4 
We have previously held that a union is not required to agree with a unit 
employee's interpretation of the contract.5 Furthermore, we will not substitute our 
217 PERB 1J3013, at 3030 (1984). 
334 PERB 1J4581, at 4768. 
4Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules mandates that improper practice charges 
be filed within four months of the date of the conduct which is the subject of the charge. 
5See Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580 and Central New York Regional 
Transp. Auth., 32 PERB 1J3053 (1999). 
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judgment for that of a union's regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances.6 More 
importantly, the filing period for an improper practice charge is not tolled while ancillary 
proceedings [grievance prosecution] are being pursued by or on behalf of a charging 
party.7 
Since the predicate for Haughey's improper practice charge is the Association's 
failure to represent him in the grievance, and Haughey was aware of the Association's 
position prior to November 29, 1999, we affirm the ALJ's finding that the improper 
practice charge filed on November 1, 2000, almost one year later, must be dismissed 
as untimely. Based upon our determination, we need not reach the issue of mootness. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ 
J©hn T. Mitchell, Member 
6See Dist. Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB1J3062 (1995). 
7
 See Orange County Com Off. Benv. Ass'n, 28 PERB fl3081 (1995). 
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In the Matter of 




- and - CASE NO. C-5140 
BEAVER RIVER CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
SHEILA F. PATTERSON, for Petitioner 
TRACY R. SCHOLZ, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 7, 2001, the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) determined that the Beaver River Central School District Non-
Instructional Employees Association/NYSUT/AFT/AFL-CIO (Association) met the 
requirements of §201.9(g)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) for certification of the 
Association without an election as the representative of the bargaining unit agreed to by 
the parties. The Director forwarded the record of the proceeding to the Board for 
issuance of a certification order. 
Since we have not yet issued a certification order and we have received 
information which may indicate that the Association no longer meets the requirements 
Board - C-5140 
of §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules, the matter is remanded to the Director to ascertain the 
employees' choice by conducting an investigation.1 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
LiA^c^l^Ou^j'^ ^ - < j t * - » . 
R^Cueyas,Chairman 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
17bw? of Campbell, 17 PERB 1J3071 (1984). See also Town of New Haven, 20 
PERB T|3015 (1987); Mohawk Valley Gen'l Hospital, 19 PERB TJ3020 (1986). 
n STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SACHEM SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYEES UNION, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
SACHEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 74, SEIU, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
iT iS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Sachem School District Employees Union 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
CASE NO. C-5079 
Certification - C-5079 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All permanent full-time and part-time employees in the following job 
categories: custodial worker, groundsmen, head custodian, head 
groundsmen, automobile mechanic, maintenance mechanic, chief 
custodian, athletic groundskeeper, driver-messenger, console 
operator, roving guard, bus driver, cook, supervisory cook, food 
service worker, and bus monitor. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Sachem School District Employees Union. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michae) R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Jdhn T. Mitchell, Member 
1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LIBERTY TEACHING ASSISTANTS, MONITORS AND 
AIDES, NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5137 
LIBERTY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
- A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Liberty Teaching Assistants, Monitors and 
Aides, NYSUT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
) 
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Included: All full-time and part-time employees in the titles of teaching 
assistant, teacher aide and monitors including cafeteria monitors, 
hall monitors, study hall monitors, T1 supervisor, study hall aide, 
teacher aide/monitor, assistant, aide, teaching aide/assistant, 
aide/monitor and family worker NYS pre-K. 
Excluded: All other employe_es. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Liberty Teaching Assistants, Monitors and Aides, NYSUT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 6, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
xf^<T/ 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
